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9My Genome, My Right
stuart hogarth, julian cockbain and sigrid
sterckx
‘Everyone has the right to access and understand their personal genetic
information . . . It’s amazing to me it’s so controversial that you should be
able to get your genetic information.’1
‘The imaginary of rights is gradually replacing social justice. The decolo-
nization struggles, the civil rights and counter-cultural movements fought for
an ideal society based on justice and equality. In the human rights age, the
pursuit of collective material welfare has given way to individual gratification
and the avoidance of evil.’2
9.1 Introduction
The growing number of firms offering direct-to-consumer genetic testing
(DTCGT) has prompted commentary from scientists, clinicians, bioethi-
cists and ELSI scholars. Those critical of this nascent consumer industry
have expressed concerns about, inter alia, the absence of evidence sup-
porting the utility of DTCGT, the vulnerability of the public to mislead-
ing advertising claims and the appropriateness of marketing tests direct
to the consumer.
But even amongst those sceptics who believe that the business models
of consumer genetics firms are as shaky as their scientific claims, there
can be little doubt that one notable success they have enjoyed has been to
shift the terms of public debate about genetic testing. In the face of a
variety of efforts to regulate the consumer genetics industry, some firms
(and some of their customers and supporters) have asserted the principle
that individuals have a right to ‘their genome’. This assertion has proved
1 Anne Wojcicki quoted in Jason Madara, ‘The extraction process: meet 23andMe’s Anne
Wojcicki’, Wired (6 March 2017), www.wired.co.uk/article/the-extraction-process,
accessed 28 January 2018.
2 Costas Douzinas, ‘The paradoxes of human rights’ (2013) 20(1) Constellations 51–67.
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extremely powerful, and its broad appeal requires us to pay it careful
attention. What assumptions underpin the assertion of this genomic
right? What might be its consequences? Should this putative right be
seen as a legal right or a fundamental human right? What would be the
implication of such a right for regulatory initiatives? What implications
would it have for other forms of diagnostic testing?What other rights are
invoked (implicitly or explicitly) in the policy debate about consumer
genetics and what bearing do they have on any putative right to one’s
genome?
To understand what it is stake, it is necessary to provide some brief
background on the DTCGT industry: the range of services it offers and its
business models, the variety of regulatory responses the nascent sector
has generated and the commentary such initiatives have provoked.
Given this book’s focus on medicine and public health, we shall focus
on firms that offer health-related testing, but the industry is broader,
encompassing paternity testing, ancestry testing and lifestyle testing,
such as genes related to athletic ability. Before 2005, the first wave of
health-related DTCGT firms largely focused on nutrigenetics, testing for
genes linked to nutrient metabolism and providing tailored dietary
recommendations or selling nutritional supplements; a second wave of
firms launched around 2007 focused on offering polygenic risk tests for a
range of common diseases such as asthma, diabetes and stroke. A recent
survey3 found 246 firms, but the industry comprises mostly small start-
up firms with a high failure rate. Even 23andMe, the largest firm offering
health-related testing, is still not profitable a decade after launch.
23andMe is notable for experimenting with multiple business models:
in particular, it has tried to supplement income from test sales by lever-
aging its growing DNA database as a research platform for the pharma-
ceutical industry.
There have been two types of regulatory initiatives that have impacted
on the DTCGT market. Legislation in a number of European countries
has either banned or limited the availability of genetic tests that can be
purchased without the involvement of a medical professional – such
legislation is generally not focused solely on the issue of the DTCGT
market but has aimed to provide a more general governance framework
for genetic testing. Meanwhile in the USA, the Food and Drug
3 Andelka M. Phillips, ‘Only a click away – DTC Genetics for ancestry, health, love . . . and
more: A view of the business and regulatory landscape’ (2016) 8 Applied & Translational
Genomics 16–22.
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Administration (FDA) has policed the sector through a series of warning
letters that culminated in November 2013 in action against 23andMe, the
most high-profile firm, when the FDA shut down the health-related
portion of its testing service.
The FDA’s intervention in the DTCGT market was characterised by
some commentators as premature,4 an overreaction5 or even an infrin-
gement of the constitutional right of freedom of speech.6 The most
impassioned responses to the FDA’s 2013 action against 23andMe
invoked the language of genomic rights and framed the issue as a
Manichean conflict between the state and market, with the latter as
the guarantor of individual freedom. This position was articulated in
Forbes magazine by Harry Binswanger, a director of the Ayn Rand
Institute: ‘The real issue is not the reliability of these tests. The real
issue is the right of an individual to act on his own judgment, free of
government coercion.’7
9.2 The Right to One’s Genome
Just what might the widely claimed right to one’s genome actually mean?
A human right or a legal right? A right in relation to the information
carried by the genome or a right to the chemical material itself? A right to
own, to access, to exclude, or to use and provide to others?
The claim that people have a right to their genomes is only clear if one
establishes which right is being claimed, and particularly whether the
subject matter of the claim is material or information. Several commen-
tators making the general claim of a right to one’s genome simply
conflate the material and the information.8
The material is a rivalrous good, one that cannot be shared, and thus
potentially the basis for and covered by a claim to ‘self-ownership’.
4 Barbara Prainsack, Jenny Reardon, Richard Hindmarsh et al., ‘Personal genomes: misdir-
ected precaution’ (2008) 456 Nature 34–5.
5 Caroline F. Wright, Alison Hall and Ron L. Zimmern, ‘Regulating direct-to-consumer
genetic testing: what is the fuss about?’ (2011) 13(4) Genetic Medicine 295–300.
6 Robert C. Green and Nita A. Farahany, ‘Regulation: the FDA is overcautious on consumer
genomics’ (2014) 505 Nature 286–7.
7 Harry Binswanger, ‘FDA says, “No gene test for you: You can’t handle the truth”’, Forbes (26
November 2013), www.forbes.com/sites/harrybinswanger/2013/11/26/fda-says-no-gene-
test-for-you-you-cant-handle-the-truth/#221c75d74156, accessed 28 January 2018.
8 Michele Loi, ‘Nobody’s DNA but mine’ (2017) Journal of Medical Ethics. doi:10.1136/
medethics-2017-104188.
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The information is a non-rivalrous good, i.e. one that can be and is
shared, and one therefore that requires very special reasons for permit-
ting ownership and control rights. Thus, for example, society does
occasionally permit short-term ownership and control rights of some
non-rivalrous goods (e.g. inventions and unpublished data). Since the
information may be shared by more than one person, there can be no
question of an ownership right. Equally, since sharing that information
with others, e.g. by publishing it, may harm the interests of those having
the same genetic sequences, we consider that the ‘right to your genome’
cannot be an unrestricted right to use the information. For the purposes
of this chapter we will therefore consider the ‘right’ at maximum to be a
human right to access your genetic information.
The idea of an inviolable right to access information regarding your
genome plays on the concept that your DNA is the key to your personal
identity, the genetic blueprint that defines your essential individuality.
However, in the post-genomic age, attention has moved beyond the
genome to the epigenome, the metabolome, the proteome and the micro-
biome. Are these new ‘omic’ sciences creating new rights? In this chapter
we suggest that genomes constitute collectives as well as individuals; that
genomics is a field replete with tensions between individual rights and
collective rights; and that an individual’s exercise of her rights needs to be
constrained by regulators (rather than self-regulation) to protect those
rights of others which trump the individual’s rights.
What can an individual be allowed to do with their genetic information
once they have received it? Can access to parts of it be denied when there is
concern that the individual might suffer from or abuse that information?
These questions stem particularly from the right of others to privacy, since
genomic information, unlike genetic material (i.e. the physical thing), is
not unique to the person. Admittedly, the entirety of your genomic
information is unique to you, but relevant and concerning parts of it are
shared with others, in particular your relatives and your community.
We thus need to distinguish between:9
– A: an individual who wishes to order a DTC test
– ‘not A’: everybody else (including regulators and the state)
– ‘B’: individuals who are not A, but who are sufficiently closely related to
A that they share a greater degree of (presumable) informational
9 See Wendy Elizabeth Bonython and Bruce Baer Arnold, ‘Direct to consumer genetic testing
and the libertarian right to test’ (2017) Journal of Medical Ethics. doi: 10.1136/medethics-
2017-104188.
186 stuart hogarth, julian cockbain and sigrid sterckx
commonality between their genome and the genome of A due to
genetic or geographic relatedness than the degree of commonality in
the general population.
The interests of ‘B’ are crucial yet seem to be overlooked by many
commentators.
9.3 Human Rights
How might the idea of a right to access or own one’s genomic data fit
within our existing systems of rights?Wemight begin by considering this
putative right in relation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),10 and here we consider two rights: the right to healthcare and
the right to access scientific knowledge.
9.3.1 The Right to Healthcare
If we address first the health-related aspects of DTCGT, then the relevant
provision would seem to be Article 25 UDHR:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services.11
To what extent would this right be relevant to DTCGT?Many firms have
sought to distance themselves from the world of medical care, arguing
that what they offer is ‘recreational genomics’ or ‘lifestyle genomics’. This
rhetorical strategy is primarily a form of regulatory arbitrage, intended to
provide cover from regulatory agencies like the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), but if taken at face value, it would appear to
exclude the DTCGT firms that adopt such terminology from any con-
sideration that their services might fall under Article 25 UDHR. Further,
since many firms offer polygenic risk assessment for common diseases,
and this type of testing has not been shown to be clinically useful, let
alone medically necessary, it is not clear that even if such tests are
marketed as medical care, that they meet the test of something necessary
to ensuring health and well-being. Failing such a test would make it
10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-
human-rights, accessed 29 January 2018.
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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difficult to envisage this portion of DTCGT as part of a right to
healthcare.
Article 25 UHDR seems to be more relevant for genetic tests that are
deemed clinically useful, such as the carrier testing that 23andMe offers
for a range of singe-gene diseases. However, even medically necessary
products may not be available direct-to-consumer. For instance, in many
jurisdictions essential medicines such as antibiotics and powerful pain-
killers are only available via prescription. There is no public outcry about
this situation, and this tacit acceptance of the intermediary role played by
healthcare professionals in the provision of essential medicines suggests
that people understand the distinction between the principle that access
to a public good, such as clean drinking water, should be considered a
universal human right, and the question of how that right is delivered.
Further, many would defend the principle that equitable access to such
public goods is best guaranteed by giving the state a monopoly on
provision, rather than by relying on the private sector. The UK Human
Genetics Commission’s (HGC) report Genes Direct supported the prin-
ciple of state provision:
We feel strongly that there should be a well-funded NHS genetics service
supported by a genetically literate primary care work force, which can
properly manage and allow access to new predictive genetic tests that are
being developed. This could involve the NHS providing ready access to
testing services provided by commercial testing laboratories. It would
enable predictive genetic testing to be retained within a well-respected
model of continuing healthcare.12
State provision, it should be made clear, is not only a model for ensuring
access but also for evaluating what is medically necessary. In the context
of the UK, for instance, new genetic tests are evaluated by the UKGenetic
Testing Network in order to decide whether they should be available on
the NHS and to which patients. This evaluative process is a first level of
gatekeeping, but even if the test becomes available, then a clinician must
be persuaded that you meet the relevant clinical criteria before she will
order the test. In the clinical context of a public healthcare system, access
to technological resources must be rationed, and diagnostic tests, of any
sort, cannot be ordered simply to satisfy scientific curiosity.
Nevertheless, the HGC’s view that medically necessary genetic testing
should be available on the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), delivered
through a publicly funded health service open to all citizens, offers a
12 Human Genetics Commission, Genes Direct (London: Department of Health, 2003).
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model of how to ensure the human right enshrined in Article 25 UDHR
within an equitable framework founded on the principle of social soli-
darity rather than relying on market-based satisfaction of human rights
through costly consumer services.
As noted earlier, much of the rhetoric of FDA critics suggests a
Manichean conflict between the market and the state. It is no surprise
then, to discover that Anne Wojcicki, 23andMe’s CEO and the most
high-profile advocate of genomic rights, is a sceptic about public health-
care systems and believes that consumers should pay directly for medical
services. A 2012 article in the UK newspaper The Times reported that
Wojcicki does not believe in free public healthcare systems like the UK
National Health Service: ‘I support a monetised system, but one that
emphasises prevention and more freedom to choose’.13 Thus we can see
how the assertion of an individual’s right to access her genome is
predicated on a neoliberal philosophy that disconnects negative rights
(to be free from state interference) from positive rights (such as access to
publicly funded healthcare). As Jane Mummery characterises the neolib-
eral refashioning of democracy:
Having disconnected freedom from social justice, neoliberalismmust also
reject all ideas and practices of social or distributive justice . . . in framing
democracy merely as a mechanism for the attainment of individual free-
dom, neoliberalism can have no understanding of the political and social
ends that democracy might serve.14
It is in this context that we have to understand how the term ‘democracy’
is being operationalised when 23andMe claims that it is ‘democratizing
genomics’ (and the hostility of many DTCGT advocates to FDA regula-
tion). However, in response to Wojcicki’s neoliberal vision of how to
guarantee genomic rights, we might suggest that a right becomes a
privilege when it is dependent on a certain level of disposable income –
clean drinking water is a political right; bottled mineral water is a con-
sumer luxury. Viewed in this way, it becomes clear that DTCGT could
lead to the denial, rather than the protection, of human rights and that
state-funded healthcare provision can act as a guarantor of the human
right to necessary medical care.
13 Anne Wojcicki in Tim Teeman, ‘Married to Mr Google’, The Times (4 February 2012),
www.thetimes.co.uk/article/married-to-mr-google-nc6qc5znkwt, accessed 20 February
2018.
14 Jane Mummery, Radicalising Democracy for the 21st Century (Abingdon: Routledge,
2017), p. 153.
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9.3.2 The Right to Scientific Knowledge
Shifting from the realm ofmedical necessity and returning to the realm of
‘informational’ or ‘recreational’ genomics, a claim frequently made by
firms like 23andMe is that they are providing consumers with an oppor-
tunity to become familiar with genomic science. In this regard, we might
consider the relevance of Article 27 UDHR, which states:
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the . . . cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and
its benefits.15
For many, the rhetorical allure of the assertion of an individual’s right to
access her genome lies in the emotional appeal of its underlying assump-
tions: the Baconian belief that knowledge is power, and the idea that
the free circulation of knowledge is fundamental to democratic societies.
One immediate line of argument in response to this reasoning would be
the one outlined above – that a premium-priced consumer service is not
the optimal means to ensure equitable access to something that is a
universal human right. A second approach is to critically evaluate the
pedagogic role played by DTCGT firms. Notwithstanding Balzer’s argu-
ment16 that the contemporary overuse of the term ‘curation’ has ren-
dered it meaningless, we might suggest that the principal role of DTCGT
firms is curatorial – they select from amongst the plethora of novel
genotype/phenotype associations those that they deem worthy of report-
ing to their consumers. This was certainly the model of firms like
23andMe and Navigenics, which launched around 2007: these firms
mined the data emerging from the new wave of genome wide association
studies (GWAS) to identify genetic risk markers that could be combined
together to create polygenic risk scores for a range of diseases like asthma,
diabetes and stroke.
However, polygenic risk scores have been subject to considerable
scientific critique that brings into question the legitimacy of the pedago-
gic claims advanced by DTCGT firms. The DTCGT sector has been the
target of considerable criticism and has become a lightning rod for
broader concerns about the regulation of genetic testing. There are
three broad areas of concern about the DTCGT market:
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
16 David Balzer, Curationism: How Curating Took Over the World and Everything Else
(London: Pluto Press, 2015).
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1) information provision: information asymmetries are a classic justi-
fication for regulation and the challenges of consumer understanding
in a fast-moving and complex area of science are exacerbated by
failures in information provision by firms. For instance, in 2008 the
European Technology Assessment Group undertook a review of 38
companies offering genetic tests DTC. Using an evaluative framework
comprising a checklist of 12 criteria devised by Datta et al.,17 it
assessed the quality of information provision and found that 55 per
cent of companies (21 out of 38) complied with four or fewer of the 12
criteria, and concluded that such ‘fundamental information deficits
[had] . . . possibly far-reaching consequences for consumers’.18
2) test quality and marketing claims: a series of academic papers argued
that: i) there was insufficient evidence to support the claims made by
many of the companies;19 and ii) even amongst those firms which only
reported well-validated gene-disease associations there were major dis-
crepancies, with the same individual receiving different risk information
depending on which genetic markers are being tested for.20
Furthermore, the field was moving so quickly that a person’s risk profile
could change repeatedly as new gene-disease associations were discov-
ered.21 A 2010 report by the US Government Accountability Office
(GAO) presented at a Congressional hearing summarised these con-
cerns and quoted experts who argued that the genetics of common,
complex diseases was still a science in the making and that therefore
polygenic risk assessment lacked clinical utility.22 The report concluded
17 Adrija K. Datta, Tara J. Selman, Tony Kwok et al., ‘Quality of information accompanying on-
line marketing of home diagnostic tests’ (2008) 101(1) Journal of the Royal Society of
Medicine 34–8.
18 Leonhard Hennen, Arnold Sauter and Els van den Cruyce, Direct to Consumer Genetic
Testing: Final Report (Bonn: European Technology Assessment Group, 2009), p. 38.
19 A. Cecile J. W. Janssens, Marta Gwinn, Linda A. Bradley et al., ‘A critical appraisal of the
scientific basis of commercial genomic profiles used to assess health risks and personalize
health interventions’ (2008) 82(3) American Journal of Human Genetics 593–9.
20 Raluca Mihaescu, Mandy van Hoek, Eric J. G. Sijbrands et al., ‘Evaluation of risk
prediction updates from commercial genome-wide scans’ (2009) 11(6) Genetic
Medicine. 588–94; Pauline C. Ng, Sarah S. Murray, Samuel Levy et al., ‘An agenda for
personalised medicine’ (2009) 461 Nature 724–6.
21 Mihaescu, van Hoek, Sijbrands et al., ‘Evaluation of risk prediction updates from com-
mercial genome-wide scans’.
22 Government Accountability Office, Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Tests: Misleading Test
Results Are Further Complicated by Deceptive Marketing and Other Questionable Practices
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), pp. 8–9.
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that DTCGT firms were misleading a public that lacked the scientific
expertise to assess the veracity of companies’ claims.
3) service quality: although tests for susceptibility to common diseases
have been the mainstay of the DTCGTmarket, some companies offer
more traditional clinical genetic tests to consumers, reporting on a
range of monogenic disorders. Here the concern is not the lack of
clinical validation, but the lack of medical supervision and pre- and
post-test counselling.
Translated into the language of rights, the first two concerns are
couched in terms that appeal to statutory consumer rights long estab-
lished in most, if not all, jurisdictions with mature mass-consumer
markets: the right to adequate disclosure of information before the
purchase of a service, and the right to expect that goods and services
will meet certain pre-established standards. The third of the regulatory
concerns outlined above speaks to issues of professional monopoly and
the demarcation of certain services as the preserve of appropriately
qualified professionals. We will address these issues in turn, dealing
with the first two together, before moving on to the third.
9.4 Regulation of Information
The widespread misgivings about whether DTCGT firms could be relied
upon as curators of genomic science impelled the FDA to take regulatory
action, even as the agency expressed support for the principle that
consumers have a right to access their genomic data:
We don’t have an issue with people getting their own DNA data . . . We
just have concerns with how it’s being interpreted . . . People have every
right to get their data . . .Wewant to make sure they can trust what they’re
being told about it, too.23
After the FDA shut down 23andMe’s health-related testing service in
2013, Robert Green and Nita Farahany questioned whether the type of
information that the firm offered consumers could really be classed as
medical and whether the FDA might be in breach of the First
Amendment of the US Constitution, which protects both ‘the rights of
23 Alberto Gutierrez quoted in Diane Brady, ‘Do genetic tests need doctors? FDA defends its
challenge to 23andMe’, Bloomberg Businessweek (27 November 2013), www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2013–11-27/do-genetic-tests-need-doctors-fda-defends-its-chal
lenge-to-23andme, accessed 29 January 2018.
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individuals to receive information, and of “commercial speech”’.24
Academic commentators like the lawyer Barbara Evans and the social
scientist Jennie Reardon have invoked historical parallels to illustrate the
importance of the principles at stake in the free flow of genetic informa-
tion. Equating the completion of the Human Genome Project to the
invention of the printing press, Evans compares contemporary disputes
about access to the genomic ‘Book of Life’ to the debate about whether to
translate the Bible into English so that it could be read by ordinary
people.25 Reardon connects the FDA’s reaction to 23andMe’s attempt
to create a mass consumer market for genomic data to historic fears of
mob rule undermining democracy.26 Rather more pragmatically, Anne
Wojcicki utilises the idea of information flows to question the very
feasibility of regulation:
If you get your genome done, you can ship it off to Canada or China or
other places in the world and get an interpretation. So how do you
regulate information? That’s one of the issues. I’m not sure you can
hold it back.27
The need to protect the free circulation of information is not a new
argument against the FDA’s role in regulating biomedical innovation.
It is, moreover, an idea that is closely related to a fundamental tenet of
neoliberal philosophy – the superiority of the market as a processor of
information – and that links in turn to historic efforts by US neoliberals
to undermine the legitimacy of FDA’s authority. As Edward Nik-Khah
has recently revealed,28 the Chicago School of Economics has, since 1972,
worked with the pharmaceutical industry to challenge the regulatory
regime established by the 1962 Kefauver Amendment29 to the US
24 Robert C. Green and Nita A. Farahany, ‘Regulation: the FDA is overcautious on con-
sumer genomics’ (2014) 505 Nature 286–7.
25 Barbara J. Evans, ‘The First Amendment right to speak about the human genome’ (2014)
16(3) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 549–63.
26 Jenny Reardon, ‘The “persons” and “genomics” of personal genomics’ (2011) 8(1)
Personalized Medicine 95–107.
27 Robert Hof, ‘“We are going for change”: A conversation with 23andMe CEO Anne
Wojcicki’, Forbes (15 August 2014), www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2014/08/15/we-
are-going-for-change-a-conversat ion-with-23andme-ceo-anne-wojcicki/
#5af96b275477, accessed 29 January 2018.
28 Edward Nik-Khah, ‘Neoliberal pharmaceutical science and the Chicago School of
Economics’ (2014) 44(4) Social Studies of Science 489–517.
29 Drug Efficacy Amendment (‘Kefauver Harris Amendment’) PL 87–781 (10 October
1962).
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Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C),30 as what can be seen as
part of a mobilisation by US industry against the broader rise of con-
sumer protection regulations. In his contribution to the 1972 conference
that inaugurated this assault on the FDA, Sam Peltzman, a leading
member of the Chicago School of Economics, followed the classic neo-
liberal line in arguing that it was themarketplace that was most capable of
generating new data on pharmaceuticals:
His primary complaint about the 1962 Amendments was that they had in
fact decreased the value of information available to consumers: FDA
restrictions on pharmaceutical companies’ claims would decrease the
amount of information on non-sanctioned uses of drugs, while any
reduction in marketing for a drug of a particular brand would reduce
information about the drug type in general.31
Thus, in the absence of measured discussion of what regulation of
the DTCGT market might look like in practice, the FDA’s critics
frequently simply conflated regulation with proscription and pre-
sented a stark choice between rights and regulation. However, to
return to our analogy with the state’s role in ensuring clean water
supply as a human right, even those who advocate privatisation of
water services might concede the need for state regulation to create a
framework within which firms can operate (indeed the privatisation
of public utilities has generally been accompanied by the establish-
ment of state agencies to regulate the newly created markets).
Regulators play a variety of functions in such markets, but two
fundamental regulatory functions that are relevant here are the set-
ting and enforcement of standards; it is precisely these functions that
FDA has now performed in the DTCGT market in the course of
approving two submissions from 23andMe. The first approval in
2015 covered carrier testing for a number of genetic diseases and
the second was for a number of genetic risk tests (although not any
polygenic risk scores). Each approval was accompanied by a special
controls document, a regulatory guidance that established a new
standard for validating this specific class of tests. These standards
encompassed not only the scientific approach to validation of diag-
nostic accuracy, but also the evidentiary requirements for firms to
30 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C).
31 Sam Pelzman cited in Edward Nik-Khah, ‘Neoliberal pharmaceutical science and the
Chicago School of Economics’ (2014) 44(4) Social Studies of Science 489–517.
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demonstrate that consumers can understand the information they
receive.32
9.5 Regulation through Professional Monopoly
Nonetheless, these recent approvals notwithstanding, FDA continues to
restrict what 23andMe can offer. In relation to genetic risk assessment,
the agency has not approved BRCA1/2 testing for breast cancer risk and
has publicly stated that the potential consequences of positive BRCA
results, in particular prophylactic mastectomy, are so serious that the test
requires the involvement of healthcare professionals.33 Again, to return
to the analogy with the sale of medicines, what has been created is a
mixed market in which some tests are available DTC and others can only
be accessed via a clinician. This approach might seem like an appropriate
balance of freedoms and protections to some, and has been implicit in
the approach of most DTCGT firms, which have been highly selective in
the types of genetic data they report to customers.
The prescription-only approach speaks to the issue of the quality of
service provided, which was the third of the regulatory concerns outlined
above, and in particular to issues of professional monopoly and the
demarcation of certain services as the preserve of appropriately qualified
professionals. Professional standard-setting is another a way to guarantee
standards for consumers, but the recourse to professional monopoly as a
means to ensure those standards has been attacked by DTCGT advocates
as the protection of producer rights at the expense of consumer choice. In
the neoliberal era, producer rights have increasingly been eclipsed by
consumer rights; however, even Adam Smith, who was first to crown the
consumer sovereign, stated that: ‘Consumption is the sole end and
purpose of all production and the welfare of the producer ought to be
attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the
consumer.’34 Smith’s assertion leaves open the possibility that producer
32 Margaret Curnutte, ‘Regulatory controls for direct-to-consumer genetic tests: A case
study on how the FDA exercised its authority’ (2017) 36(3) New Genetics and Society
209–26.
33 Alberto Gutierrez in Diane Brady, ‘Do genetic tests need doctors? FDA defends its
challenge to 23andMe’, Bloomberg Businessweek (27 November 2013), www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2013–11-27/do-genetic-tests-need-doctors-fda-defends-its-chal
lenge-to-23andme, accessed 29 January 2018.
34 Adam Smith,Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 376.
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rights may in some instances be a necessary guarantor of consumer
rights.
Aside from the FDA’s regulatory intervention in the US market,
there are other legal restrictions that address the consumer diagnos-
tics market and/or genetic testing in particular. Some states have
limits on the legal right to purchase diagnostic tests without the
involvement of a healthcare professional or have specific restrictions
relating to genetic testing. A succession of policy reports in the last
two decades has established a broad consensus on the standard of
care for clinical genetic testing, including the need for informed
decision-making, supported by appropriately qualified healthcare
professionals (often encompassing genetic counselling), and
the need to ensure rigorous, independent evaluation of tests before
they enter routine clinical use. These ideas have been enshrined in
transnational standards such as the Council of Europe’s 2008
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes, and
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
2007 Best Practice Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Molecular
Genetic Testing.35 However, both these documents state that not all
genetic tests require the same standard of care. The need for the
involvement of a healthcare professional in genetic testing is also
enshrined in legislation in some EU member states, including
France, Germany and Portugal, although there is no evidence of
active enforcement36 (it is also unclear how many states have imple-
mented the standards set out in the OECD guidelines).
In the USA, state law also dictates whether healthcare provider
authorisation is required to obtain a laboratory test, including a genetic
test. Some states explicitly permit labs to deal directly with patients
without authorisation from a healthcare provider for specific tests (such
35 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (2008) (CETS No. 203);
OECD, Best Practice Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Molecular Genetic Testing
(2007); Dolores Ibarreta and Stuart Hogarth, ‘Quality issues in clinical genetic services:
regulatory issues and international conventions’ in Ulf Kristoffersson, Jörg Schmidtke
and Jean-Jacques Cassiman (eds.), Quality Issues in Clinical Genetic Services (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2010).
36 Pascal Borry, Rachel E. van Hellemondt, Dominique Sprumont et al., ‘Legislation in
direct-to-consumer genetic testing in seven European countries’ (2012) 20(7) European
Journal of Human Genetics 715–21.
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as cholesterol or pregnancy tests).37 Other states, such as New York,
explicitly proscribe all DTC testing, and still other states have no
relevant legislation. Currently, 25 states and the District of Columbia
permit DTC laboratory testing without restriction, whereas 13 categori-
cally prohibit it. DTC testing for certain specified categories of tests is
allowed in 12 states but it is not clear whether these laws would extend
to genetic tests. In 2014, the Clinical Laboratories Amendments Act was
amended to let patients request that test reports be sent to them, instead
of or as well as to their physician. This amendment only applies to
laboratories covered by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act Privacy Rule and is designed to give patients ‘con-
trol of their personal health information’.
Upon request by a patient (or the patient’s personal representative), the
laboratory may provide patients, their personal representatives, and those
persons specified under 45 CFR 164.524(c)(3)(ii), as applicable, with
access to completed test reports that, using the laboratory’s authentication
process, can be identified as belonging to that patient.38
9.6 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed two fundamental aspects of the debate about
genomic rights: the assumption that a right to one’s genome trumps
other rights and the framing of regulatory intervention as a Manichean
conflict between state and market. Much of the preceding discussion
might be considered as an exploration of conflicting genomic rights – the
right to unfettered access to information regarding one’s genome con-
flicts with legislation and regulations designed to safeguard other rights.
The FDA’s regulation of DTCGT firms has sought to ensure that con-
sumers rights have access to clear and comprehensive information in the
testing process. Documents such as the OECD Guidelines and the
Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol that emphasise the need for
the involvement of a healthcare professional with genetic expertise in the
pre- and post-test processes of deciding to order a test and then
37 Genetics and Public Policy Center, Survey of Direct-to-Consumer Testing Statutes and
Regulations (Washington, DC: Genetics and Policy Center, 2007), https://repository
.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/511162/DTCStateLawChart.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 29 January 2018.
38 42 CFR 493.1291(l).
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interpreting, and acting upon the test results, can be seen as establishing
the individual’s right to a certain standard of care.
Thus, there is the question of whether the right to access information
regarding one’s genome is absolute and inalienable or whether it must
take its place somewhere within a field of overlapping and sometimes
conflicting rights, taking precedence over some but outranked by others.
Furthermore, in practical terms, the ability to exercise this right is limited
by the availability of genetic testing. As noted above, in public healthcare
systems, access to genetic testing must be balanced against other clinical
priorities. The individual’s right to access to information regarding their
genome might be outranked by the collective right to prioritise health-
care spending.
But what if the individual is willing to spend their own money on
buying a genetic test from a private provider? Here we return to the issue
of the conflict between the right to exercise autonomy as a consumer in a
market and the right of consumers/patients to enjoy a collectively defined
standard of care (and of course such standards are always collectively
defined). Absent the collective enforcement of this standard of care, then
consumers are vulnerable to those wishing to offer cheaper testing
services which may not be of the same quality. Would it be an unaccep-
table breach of autonomy to regulate the commercial genetics market to
ensure certain standards, keeping out companies which do not meet
those standards? We would submit that the assertion of the autonomous
individual’s right to access their genomic information does not preclude
the possibility of legitimate forms of state intervention in the consumer
genetics market.
In sum, we would suggest that, given its relevance to healthcare, an
individual has a human right to access to their genomic information, but
that this is a negative rather than a positive right and is subject to
reasonable state regulation. The right extends to a right to control access
to and use of genomic information derived from the individual, and to
limit publication of genomic information from close relatives. However,
the right does not equate to ownership of data. In view of the correspond-
ing rights of others, the individual’s right cannot extend to an unlimited
right to publish their genomic information.
The complex interplay of individual and collective rights and the
question of the state’s role in establishing and enforcing such rights
illustrates the inadequacy of the state/market dichotomy that underpins
much criticism of regulatory initiatives in this field. Such rhetoric is not
uncommon amongst DTCGT firms like 23andMe, which are part of a
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Silicon Valley culture of disruptive innovation and operate with a busi-
ness model predicated on regulatory arbitrage and a hostility to govern-
ment fuelled by the libertarian anti-statism of Ayn Rand, a key
intellectual inspiration for many leading figures in the West Coast tech-
nology sector.39 Such anti-statism, redolent of an older tradition of
Jeffersonian democracy, not only fails to translate well to Europe, but it
perpetuates a misconception of American success as predicated on a
weak federal government, a myth that is nowhere more apparent than
in Silicon Valley, where industrial success has been heavily reliant on
state funding for R&D.
In fact, public and private sector institutions are densely intertwined in
the field of genomics. Much attention is focused at the moment on
standards for genomic data and the respective roles of public and private
actors in establishing standards and platforms for the sharing of scientific
data. In the USA, the Obama administration’s Precision Medicine initia-
tive linked academic science, industrial R&D and the FDA together to
pursue new standard-setting initiatives. The language of pipelines and
flows draws us back to our analogy with the water supply. In contem-
porary society, we accept that some fundamental forms of physical
infrastructure are best provided by the state, but in the nineteenth
century there was considerable resistance to the right of the state to
compel individual households to connect to a communal system for the
supply of water and the disposal of human waste.
Consumer genomics companies already benefit from the free flow of
scientific data from publicly funded research. The second wave of
DTCGT firms including Navigenics and 23andMe that launched in
2007 did so on the back of the new wave of scientific data emerging
from large, transnational genome wide association studies (GWAS) such
as the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium.
The interpenetration and mutual dependence of state and market
indicate the limitations of rights-based rhetoric that pits one against the
other. As this chapter has demonstrated, the invocation of genomic rights
is not a short cut to closure on deliberation about the complex trade-offs
between different needs and interests. Instead it opens up a complex
terrain on which can be mapped out a variety of positions and interests.
39 Stuart Hogarth, ‘Valley of the unicorns: Consumer genomics, venture capital and digital
disruption’ (2017) 36(3) New Genetics and Society 250–72.
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